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benefits. This paper advances this rethinking by evaluating the relationship between
business registration and future firm performance. Until now, the assumption has been
that starting-up unregistered is linked to weaker firm performance. Using World Bank
Enterprise Survey data on 2494 formal enterprises in Turkey, and controlling for other
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decision, the finding is that formal enterprises that started-up unregistered and spent
longer unregistered have significantly higher subsequent annual sales and productivity
growth rates compared with those registered from the outset. This is argued to be
because in such weak institutional environments, the advantages of registering from the
outset are outweighed by the benefits of deferring business registration and the low
risks of detection and punishment. The resultant implication is that there is a need to
shift away from the conventional eradication approach based on the negative depiction
of informal entrepreneurship as poorly performing, and towards a more facilitating
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formal institutional deficiencies that lead entrepreneurs to decide to delay the registra-
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Introduction
Recently, a small but burgeoning literature has begun to tentatively explore more positive
representations of informal sector entrepreneurship, by which is here meant starting-up and/
or owning and managing a business venture which does not register with and/or declare
some or all of their production and/or sales to the authorities for tax, benefit and/or labour
law purposes when they should do so (Ketchen et al. 2014; McKenzie and Sakho 2010;
Siqueira et al. 2014;Williams and Shahid 2015;Williams et al. 2013, 2015). The aim of this
paper is to advance this emerging re-representation of informal sector entrepreneurship by
evaluating the impacts of delaying business registration on firm performance. Until now,
informal entrepreneurship has been widely depicted in a negative manner as poorly
performing unproductive endeavour, which is deleterious to economic development and
growth (Baumol 1990; La Porta and Shleifer 2008, 2014). By showing how formal
enterprises that start-up unregistered and spend longer unregistered in Turkey gain signifi-
cant advantages, enabling them to subsequently become higher-performing enterprises than
their counterparts that started-up registered, the intention is to start to question this dominant
negative depiction and to open up informal entrepreneurship to re-representation as a more
positive phenomenon than so far considered.
Reporting World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data on the relationship between
informal entrepreneurship and firm performance in Turkey, this paper therefore ad-
vances understanding of informal entrepreneurship in three ways. Empirically, the
widespread a priori assumption that starting-up unregistered has a negative impact on
firm performance is tentatively refuted by showing how sales and productivity growth
rates are significantly higher in formal enterprises that started-up unregistered than
those registered from the outset in Turkey. Theoretically, therefore, this significant
positive association between being unregistered at start-up and firm performance not
only provides validation for a more positive representation of informal entrepreneurship
but also tentatively displays that in weak institutional environments, the advantages of
business registration are outweighed by the benefits of non-registration and low risks of
detection and punishment. Finally, and from a policy perspective, the significant impact
is to demonstrate the need for a shift away from the conventional eradication approach
based on the negative depiction of informal entrepreneurship as poorly performing
endeavour, and towards a more positive facilitating approach that improves the benefits
resulting from business registration and tackles the systemic formal institutional defi-
ciencies that lead entrepreneurs to start-up their ventures on an unregistered basis.
To do this, the first section frames the contributions of this paper to the entrepreneur-
ship literature by outlining the burgeoning literature on informal entrepreneurship and the
emergent shift from a negative to a more positive depiction of such entrepreneurship.
Given this, the second section focuses upon the relationship between informal entrepre-
neurship and firm performance, reviewing the conventional depiction of nonregistration
as negatively affecting firm performance followed by the rationales for conversely
viewing nonregistration as beneficial to subsequent firm performance. To evaluate the
resultant propositions regarding the relationship between firm performance and starting-
up unregistered, the third section introduces the data, namely World Bank Enterprise
Survey (WBES) harmonised data on 2494 enterprises in Turkey and modelling frame-
work here employed. In the fourth section, we present the results. Finding evidence that
formal enterprises that started-up unregistered and spent longer unregistered have
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significantly higher subsequent annual sales and productivity growth rates than those
registered from the outset, the fifth and final section discusses the theoretical and policy
implications along with the limitations of this study and future research required.
Perspectives towards of informal entrepreneurship
For much of the twentieth century, informal entrepreneurship was largely deemed unim-
portant and unworthy of scholarly attention. A modernisation theory prevailed that
depicted informal endeavour as some minor and declining remnant of an earlier mode
of production and its continuing persistence in countries as signalling their ‘underdevel-
opment’ and ‘backwardness’ (Lewis 1959; Geertz 1963; Gilbert 1998). The widespread
belief was that such endeavour would naturally and inevitably disappear with economic
advancement and modernisation. Over the past few decades however, the informal sector
in general, and informal entrepreneurship more particularly, has been recognised as an
extensive and persistent feature of the economic landscape (Schneider andWilliams 2013;
ILO 2013; Williams 2015a, b). Indeed, two-thirds of businesses in developing countries
have been shown to be unregistered at start-up (Autio and Fu 2015). This recognition of
the extensiveness of informal entrepreneurship has led to the emergence of a burgeoning
literature and new theorisations of such entrepreneurship.
Firstly, some have sought to update conventional modernisation theory (La Porta
and Shleifer 2008, 2014). Although the extensiveness of informality is now recognised,
this nonetheless retains the depiction of two disconnected sectors and a negative
representation of informal entrepreneurs as typically uneducated people operating small
unproductive enterprises in separate ‘bottom of the pyramid’ markets producing low-
quality products for low-income consumers using little capital and adding little value
(La Porta and Shleifer 2014). A second loose grouping of scholars adopting a struc-
turalist perspective however, recognises that the formal and informal spheres are not
disconnected. Instead, the growth of informal entrepreneurship is deemed an inherent
feature and direct by-product of a deregulated open world economy where outsourcing
and subcontracting have become ways of integrating informal enterprises into contem-
porary capitalism so as to reduce production costs (Castells and Portes 1989; Davis
2006; Meagher 2010; Slavnic 2010; Taiwo 2013). Nevertheless, although recognising
informal entrepreneurship as inter-twined with the formal realm, it remains seen as a
negative phenomenon.
In both the modernisation and structuralist perspectives, therefore, economies are
viewed as losing ‘natural’ competitiveness because productive formal enterprises suffer
unfair competition from unproductive informal enterprises (Leal Ordóñez 2014; Lewis
2004). Governments are viewed as losing both regulatory control over work conditions
(ILO 2014) and tax revenue (Bajada and Schneider 2005), and customers as lacking legal
recourse and certainty that health and safety regulations have been followed (Williams and
Martinez-Perez 2014b). Informal entrepreneurs, meanwhile, are viewed as ‘necessity-
driven’ (Castells and Portes 1989), lacking access to capital, credit and financial services
(ILO 2014), which when combined with their need to keep the business small to avoid the
authorities (Williams et al. 2012), lack of advice and support (Barbour and Llanes 2013)
and an inability to secure property rights (De Beer et al. 2013), mean that they become
locked in a ‘poverty trap’ (McKenzie and Woodruff 2006).
Int Entrep Manag J
Recently however, alternative more positive discourses have emerged. The ability of
informal entrepreneurs to create jobs has been viewed as a potential benefit for developing
economies and governments (Ketchen et al. 2014) and this sphere has started to be seen as a
breeding ground for the micro-enterprise system (Barbour and Llanes 2013). Formal
enterprises are viewed as potentially benefiting from cheaper sources of labour and raw
materials (Ketchen et al. 2014), potential formal entrepreneurs from the opportunity to use
this realm as a test-bed for their business ventures (Williams andMartinez-Perez 2014a) and
informal entrepreneurs from this escape route from corrupt public officials and the regulatory
burden in contexts where this stifles business development (Tonoyan et al. 2010). Customers
especially in ‘base of the pyramid’ markets, meanwhile, are seen as potentially benefiting
from more affordable goods and services (Ketchen et al. 2014; London et al. 2014).
A catalyst for this more positive representation has been recognition that informal
entrepreneurship is not always necessity-driven but often a matter of choice (Cross
2000; Franck 2012; Gërxhani 2004; Maloney 2004; Perry and Maloney 2007; Williams
2009; Williams and Gurtoo 2012; Williams and Youssef 2015). The resultant agency-
oriented theorisations of informal entrepreneurship are of two broad varieties. On the
one hand, a group of ‘legalist’ scholars depict informal entrepreneurs as rational
economic actors who, after weighing up the costs of informality and benefits of
formality, decide not to operate in the formal economy. Informal entrepreneurship is
more prevalent in developing than developed countries therefore, due to formalisation
having higher costs (e.g., time and effort to formally register, burdensome regulations,
compliance costs) and fewer benefits (De Soto 1989, 2001; Nwabuzor 2005), which
commonly result in the costs of formalising not exceeding the benefits (Cross 2000).
On the other hand, and drawing inspiration from institutional theory (North 1990),
another agency-oriented group of scholars adopting a more ‘social actor’ approach, view
informal entrepreneurship as occurring outside of formal institutional prescriptions but
within the norms, values and beliefs of informal institutions and therefore as socially
legitimate endeavour (Kistruck et al. 2015; Siqueira et al. 2014;Webb et al. 2009). Informal
entrepreneurship thus results from formal institutional deficiencies, such as relatively weak
legal and contract enforcement systems (Puffer et al. 2010; Sutter et al. 2013), and/or
‘because of the incongruence between what is defined as legitimate by formal and informal
institutions’ (Webb et al. 2009: 495). If symmetry exists between formal and informal
institutions, informal entrepreneurship only occurs unintentionally (e.g., due to a lack of
awareness of the codified laws and regulations). When formal and informal institutions do
not align however, the result is more informal entrepreneurship (De Castro et al. 2014;
Kistruck et al. 2015; Siqueira et al. 2014; Vu 2014; Webb et al. 2013, 2014). Indeed, the
greater the degree of asymmetry, the greater the level of informal entrepreneurship
(Williams and Horodnic 2015; Williams and Shahid 2015).
Until now, however, and despite this emergence of more positive representations of
informal entrepreneurship, few if any scholars have questioned the view that informal
entrepreneurship is associated with weaker firm performance.
Informal entrepreneurship and firm performance
For many years, informal entrepreneurship has been seen as poorly performing endeavour
relative to formal entrepreneurship (ILO 2007; Farrell 2004; Palmer 2007). This poorer
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performance thesis prevails to varying extents across all representations of informal
entrepreneurship. Firstly, modernisation theory, views informal enterprises as hugely
inefficient comparedwith formal enterprises, operating in different ‘bottom of the pyramid’
markets and unlikely to be capable of charging lower prices for the same products (La Porta
and Shleifer 2008, 2014). Secondly, the structuralist approach views the informal sector as
a refuge where necessity-driven low-productivity firms, requiring low levels of start-up
capital, stay small to avoid detection and lack the scale to produce efficiently, although the
cost advantages gained by avoiding taxes and regulations more than offsets their low
productivity and small scale (Farrell 2004; Palmer 2007). Perhaps surprisingly, this poorer
performance thesis also persists among scholars adopting more positive agency-oriented
perspectives. The rational economic actor and social actor explanations depict informal
entrepreneurship as less productive than formal enterprises and as resulting from the
general failure of ‘weak’ institutions to provide sufficient resources towarrant formalisation
(De Soto 1989; Kistruck et al. 2015; Wunsch-Vincent et al. 2015).
To support this consensus that informal enterprises are worse performing than their
formal counterparts, most scholars cite the seminal study by La Porta and Shleifer (2008:
344) who find that ‘Productivity is much higher in small formal firms than in informal
firms, and it rises rapidly with the size of formal firms’. This conclusion is reached by
analysing World Bank Informal Surveys in 13 countries and Micro-Enterprise Surveys in
14 countries (19 in Africa, six in Asia and two in Latin America). The average Informal
Survey comprised 31 registered and 192 unregistered firms, and the average Micro-
Enterprise Survey 137 registered and 77 unregistered enterprises (i.e., the total sample
was 2321 registered and 3574 unregistered enterprises). The non-representative sampling
strategy in each country was that ‘World Bank contractors identified neighborhoods
perceived to have a large number of informal firms’ (La Porta and Shleifer 2008: 295).
Based on this small unrepresentative sample, statistically significant differences are found
in the performance of registered and unregistered enterprises in 10 of the 25 countries on
value added per employee at the 0.1 level (and four countries at the 0.01 level), 17 of the
26 countries on sales per employee at the 0.1 level (and 12 at the 0.01 level), and in 18 of
the 26 countries on output per employee at the 0.1 level (12 at the 0.01 level). Hence,
significant variations in firm performance are far from universal. Indeed, unregistered
enterprises outperformed registered enterprises in six of the 25 countries on value added
per employee, three of the 26 countries on sales per employee and four of the 26 on output
per employee (see La Porta and Shleifer 2008: Tables 13 and 14). More importantly, they
explicitly state that the overall productivity gap disappears and ‘unregistered firms are not
unusually unproductive once we take into account their expenditure on inputs, the human
capital of their top managers, and their small size’ (La Porta and Shleifer 2008: 335).
Similar weak evidence exists in the few other studies of this poorer performance
thesis (Fajnzylber et al. 2009; Farrell 2004; McKinsey Global Institute 2003). For
example, although Fajnzylber et al. (2009) claim that Mexican firms paying taxes
exhibit between 15 and 60% higher ‘productivity’ levels, their measure of productivity
is profit levels and self-employment income and they do not control for the full range of
firm-level determinants influencing firm productivity and performance.
This poorer performance thesis, and importantly for this paper, has been similarly
assumed to apply to formal enterprises which start-up unregistered relative to enterprises
registered from the outset. As La Porta and Shleifer (2008: 279) assert, ‘the differences in
productivity between formal and informal firms are so large that it is hard to believe that
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simply registering unregistered firms would eliminate the gap.’ The only known compar-
ison of the firm performance of formal enterprises starting-up unregistered compared with
enterprises registered from the outset of operations, nevertheless, is a study of World Bank
survey data on 355 unregistered start-ups across seven Latin American countries (104 in
Colombia, 72 in Argentina, 72 in Bolivia, 66 inMexico 20 in Peru, 12 in Uruguay and nine
in Panama). Perry et al. (2007: 173) find that unregistered start-ups ‘at least initially, exhibit
on average, much lower levels of output per worker, after controlling for firm size, time in
business, sector and region’. However, this is a small sample, the productivity gap is
statistically significant in only four of the seven countries studied and the headline average
national figure of 29% lower productivity for unregistered start-ups is heavily skewed by
the Peru figure where the productivity gap is over 50%, is not statistically significant, and
only 20 unregistered start-ups were surveyed. Given the strong consensus but weak
evidence-base, we here revisit this supposedly negative relationship between non-
registration at start-up and firm performance.
Conventionally, therefore, formal enterprises starting-up unregistered have been
viewed as subsequently worse performing than those who register from the outset.
However, recognising that many entrepreneurs operate unregistered out of choice
(Gërxhani 2004; Maloney 2004; Perry and Maloney 2007; Williams and Youssef
2015), and adopting a more agency-oriented perspective, the opposite could be argued;
that formal enterprises who start-up unregistered subsequently outperform enterprises
registered from the outset. This is because those formal enterprises that remain unreg-
istered during their start-up phase at least initially avoid paying taxes, burdensome
regulations and the additional costs imposed on formal enterprises by corrupt public
sector officials for example, and thus appear to possess many of the pre-requisites to
outperform the enterprises that suffer such constraints from the very start of their
business venture. As La Porta and Shleifer (2014) assert, formal firms have to pay
taxes and comply with regulations, so they have a huge costs disadvantage relative to
those unregistered at start-up. Operating initially unregistered therefore, might well
positively influence subsequent firm performance. Moreover, if registration does not
open up access to a wide range of benefits of formality, such as public goods provision
by government and access to credit to expand existing establishments, then the costs of
registration will outweigh the benefits. Until now, however, few if any studies have
evaluated the proposition that there is better subsequent firm performance by formal
enterprises that started-up unregistered compared with those that registered from the
outset. The main rationale to test whether the performance of unregistered firms at start-
up is to contribute to the extant literature which predominantly paints a negative picture
about them. To begin to do so therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested:
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for key determinants of firm performance and the
endogeneity of registration status, enterprises starting-up unregistered and then
registering display better levels of firm performance than those starting-up
registered.
Similarly, competing views exist on whether and how the length of time that a formal
enterprise spent unregistered influences future firm performance. On the one hand, and
from the perspective that unregistered enterprises are worse performing, it might be
posited that this will further diminish future firm performance. Unable to grow and
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expand due to limited access to credit and loans, and the need to remain small in order to
avoid the authorities (Farrell 2004; Palmer 2007), the longer they remain unregistered the
worse will be the firm performance of a formal enterprise that spent a longer time period
unregistered compared with an enterprise that was registered from the outset.
On the other hand however, and from the perspective that being unregistered at start-
up improves subsequent firm performance, it could be argued that the longer they spend
unregistered before registering, the greater will be their advantage over those register-
ing from the outset. This is because the longer they remain freed from paying taxes,
burdensome regulations and corruption in the public sector for example, the more the
advantages that allow them to outperform their counterparts starting-up registered are
consolidated and the greater will be the differential. This may be particularly pertinent
in contexts where ‘weak’ formal institutions fail to provide sufficient resources to
warrant formalisation (Kistruck et al. 2015; Wunsch-Vincent et al. 2015) and the costs
thus outweigh the benefits of registration (e.g., access to credit, opportunities to engage
with large firms and procure government contracts, reduced harassment by officials,
and access to broader training and support programs). Although in mature formal
institutional environments, therefore, there may be a point for a firm where the benefits
of registration outweigh the costs of continuing unregistered, this is less likely in
countries with weak formal institutions and the benefits of registration are fewer (De
Mel et al. 2012; Thai and Turkina 2014). As such, highlighting the importance of the
duration of staying unregistered at start-up, the following hypothesis can be tested:
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for key determinants of firm performance and the
endogeneity of registration status, the longer start-ups spend unregistered before
registering, the higher is their performance.
Modelling framework
Whether enterprises register or not at the outset can be conceived as an endogenous choice.
Therefore, our sample of formal enterprises that either registered or not at the start of
operations is a sample that is not random but rather, a sample with a systematic pattern of
registration. Hence, if we model the determinants of firm performance conditional on their
registration status and other relevant correlates without addressing the potential problem of
sample selection bias, our estimates will not be reliable. In this paper, a Heckman two-step
estimator (i.e., the Heckit estimator) is adopted to generate our econometric estimates.
Simply put, the indicators of firm performance in Turkey will be regressed on a number of
determinants controlling for the problem of sample selection bias.
Our primary equation (the equation of primary interest) that models the determinants
of firm performance can be written as;
p*i ¼ x
0
1iβ1 þ ε1i ð1Þ
Where x1idenotes a vector exogenous/control variable and p*i represents firm I’s
performance (i.e. as captured by sales, employment and productivity growth). The
performance indicators are observed for these formal firms that were both registered
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and unregistered at start-up and spent different lengths of time. When appropriate,
Eq. (1) can be specified in terms of log of (p*i ).
To describe whether a firm is registered or not, a second equation (i.e. the selection
equation) can be specified as;
R*i ¼ x
0
2iβ2 þ ε2i ð2Þ
with the following observation rule;
p*i ¼ pi;Ri ¼ 1; ifR*i > 0
& Ri ¼ 0 if R*i ≤0
ð3Þ
Riis a binary variable indicating registration status which assumes a value of 1 when a
firm starts operation with registration and takes a value of 0 otherwise. Therefore, Eq. (2)
can be estimated using a standard probit model which is appropriate to predict the
probability of registration based on a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation technique.
This constitutes the first stage of estimation. The second stage of estimation is conducted
using Eq. (1) after including the selectivity correction term generated at the first probit
stage of the estimation. The specification is completed by making a distributional
assumption on the error terms of the primary and selection equations. We assume that
ε1iand ε2ifollow a bivariate normal distribution with expectations zero and constant
variances given as σ21 andσ
2
2respectively. The covariance of the errors is given as σ12.
After controlling for self-selection, the second stage regressions enable us to test the two
hypotheses. The WBES collects data using a stratified random sample of non-agricultural
formal private sector businesses with five or more employees which is stratified by firm
size, business sector and geographic region. The firm size strata in the WBES are 5–19
(small) 20–99 (medium), and 100+ employees (large-sized firms), while sector is broken
down into manufacturing, services, transportation and construction. Public utilities, gov-
ernment services, health care, and financial services sectors are not included. Geographical
regions within the country are selected based on which cities/regions collectively contain
the majority of economic activity. The sampling frame is derived from the universe of
eligible firms, normally obtained from the country’s statistical office or another government
agency such as the tax or business licensing authorities.
To collect data, a harmonised questionnaire is used across all countries, answered by
some 1200–1800 business owners and top managers in larger economies such as
Turkey, 360 in medium-sized economies and 150 in smaller economies. Although
135 countries are covered by the WBES and data is available from 2002 to 2014, the
observed sample here is restricted to Turkey which has WBES data for 2008 to 2013.
Dependent variables
There are three key firm performance measures which serve as our dependent variables
and are expressed in terms of logs, namely: (1) Real annual sales growth (using GDP
deflators) (%): All values for sales are converted to USD using the exchange rate in the
corresponding fiscal year of the survey. Sales are deflated to 2009 using the USD
deflator; (2) Annual employment growth (%) computed as the change in full-time
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employment reported in the current fiscal year from a previous period. And (3) Annual
productivity growth (%): this is a derived variable that measures annualised growth in
labour productivity where labour productivity is real sales (using GDP deflators)
divided by full-time permanent workers. Annual productivity growth is the change in
labour productivity reported in the current fiscal year from a previous period. For most
countries the difference between the two fiscal year periods is two years. However, for
some countries the interval is three years. Hence, an annualised measure is used. The
use of the three indicators is important to show the reliability and robustness of our
findings. The hypotheses we put forward will be tested and the results will be checked
whether they hold regardless of the measure used.
Key independent variables
To evaluate the influence of informal entrepreneurship on future firm performance,
two indicators are used: (1) Started unregistered: A firm-level measure that
examines responses to the question, ‘Was this establishment formally registered
when it began operations?’. This is a dummy variable with value 1 indicating that
the firm started operations in the country without formal registration and 0 when
the firm was formally registered, and (2) Years unregistered: A continuous vari-
able counting the number of years the firm operated without formal registration.
This variable has value 0 for those firms operating formally since start-up. It is
computed by analysing the responses to three questions: ‘In what year did this
establishment begin operations?’, ‘Was this establishment formally registered
when it began operations?’ and ‘In what year was this establishment formally
registered?’. The average number of years formal firms operated without registra-
tion is computed only for firms stating they were not formally registered when
they started operations in the country.
Control variables
To measure whether formal enterprises that started-up and spent varying amounts
of time unregistered witness different levels of firm performance than enterprises
registered from the outset, it is necessary to control for other key determinants of
firm performance. Here, other characteristics are examined which previous stud-
ies reveal to significantly influence firm performance, namely firm size, legal
status and ownership structure, export orientation, sector, access to finance, the
level of technological innovation, human capital factors and other business
environment factors.
Firm size is viewed as determining firm performance, with larger firms
performing better than smaller ones (Hsieh and Olken 2014; La Porta and
Shleifer 2014), not least due to the lower average unit costs in larger firms. Firm
size is a categorical variable with value 1 for small firms with less than 20
employees, value 2 for medium size firms between 20 and 99 employees, and
value 3 for large firms with more than 100 employees.
Different types of ownership structure and legal status are often viewed as
strongly correlated with firm performance, including whether a firm is state- or
privately-owned, foreign- or domestic-owned and an open- or closed-
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shareholding, partnership or sole proprietorship (Barbera and Moores 2013;
Baghdasaryan and la Cour 2013). Given that unregistered start-ups may have
different ownership structures and legal statuses than registered start-ups, control-
ling for this is important. Here, legal status is a categorical variable indicating
whether the enterprise is an open shareholding, a closed shareholding, a sole
proprietorship, a partnership, a limited partnership, or any other form. In addition,
whether the organisation is foreign- or domestic-owned is examined using a
dummy variable with value 1 indicating if the share of the firm’s ownership held
by foreign individuals or enterprises is larger than 49% and 0 otherwise. Given
that export-oriented firms are viewed as displaying higher levels of firm perfor-
mance (La Porta and Shleifer 2008), export-orientation is also included as a
control using a dummy variable with value 1 indicating firms exporting directly
at least 1% of sales and 0 for those who sell only domestically.
Firm performance is also viewed as varying across economic sectors (Nabar and Yan
2013; Siqueira et al. 2014). Given that unregistered start-ups may be heavily concen-
trated in labour-intensive sectors with fewer returns to scale (Perry et al. 2007),
controlling for sector is important. Sector is here a categorical variable indicating the
sector of the firm (i.e., textiles, leather, garments, food, metals and machinery, elec-
tronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, wood and furniture, non-metallic and plastic
materials, auto and auto components, other manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade,
hotels and restaurants, and others).
Access to finance is strongly correlated with firm performance and given a
burgeoning literature on how unregistered start-ups lack access to finance from formal
lenders, this may well impact on future firm performance not only because they scale-
down operations but also due to the high cost of informal loans and the limited
financing available lead them to substitute (low skilled) labour for physical capital
(Amaral and Quintin 2006; Cull et al. 2007). Access to bank loans or credit is here a
dummy variable with value 1 indicating whether the firm has access to bank loans or to
a line of credit to finance its activities and 0 otherwise.
Firm performance is also often associated with the level of technological
innovation (Mansury and Love 2008). Given that most literature finds less inno-
vation and adoption of new technologies in informal enterprises and that which
does exist is more adaptation and imitation (Grimm et al. 2012; Kabecha 1998;
Wunsch-Vincent et al. 2015), this needs controlling for when examining the
impact of registration on future firm performance, especially given that some view
this as the key reason for the productivity gap between developed and developing
economies (Farrell 2004; Palmade 2005). Here, three rather limited control vari-
ables available in the WBES are used: quality certification, a dummy variable with
value 1 indicating that the firm has an internationally-recognised certification and
0 otherwise; presence of a website, a dummy variable with value 1 when the firm
uses a website for business related activities and 0 otherwise, and the use of
e-mail, a dummy variable with value 1 when a firm uses e-mail with clients and
suppliers and 0 otherwise.
Human capital factors, such as the educational level, skills and experience of
the owners, managers and the workforce, the level of professionalism, and wheth-
er there is numerical flexibility in the workforce, are asserted to have a significant
impact on firm performance (Black and Lynch 1996; Gennaiolo et al. 2013; La
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Porta and Shleifer 2014; Van der Sluis et al. 2005). Controlling for human capital
factors is thus important, especially given that informality is associated with less
productive workers due to more productive workers self-selecting formal over
informal enterprises (Amaral and Quintin 2006; Dimova et al. 2008). Here, six
control variables available in the WBES are used: top manager’s experience, a
continuous variable of the years of experience the top manager has working in the
sector; temporary workers, a variable measuring the average number of temporary
workers in the firm; permanent full-time workers, a continuous variable of the
average number of permanent full-time workers in the firm; female full-time
workers; and as a signal of professionalism, whether they use an external auditor,
a dummy variable with value 1 indicating that the firm has its annual financial
statement reviewed by an external auditor and 0 otherwise.
So too does the wider business environment determine firm performance. Two
control variables are thus used measuring whether various facets of the business
environment are a major constraint on the firm’s activity, namely: transport, a dummy
variable with value 1 indicating that transportation is a major constraint for the firm’s
activity and 0 otherwise, and electricity, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating that
electricity supply is a major constraint for the firm’s activity and 0 otherwise.
Findings
Of the formal enterprises with five or more employees surveyed in Turkey, 4%
started-up unregistered and stayed unregistered for an average of six months
before registering. To analyse their firm performance relative to those registered
from the outset, and since we are working under a normality assumption for our
subsequent econometric estimation of determinants of firm performance, we
examined the distributional properties of the three performance indicators (see
the graphs in Appendix A). This displays near normality distribution particularly
for sales and productivity growth rates. However, by expressing all the indicators
in terms of log, we have introduced further smoothing of the distribution of our
key variables to arrive at reliable estimates. The basic descriptive results of the
firm performance are that formal enterprises unregistered at the commencement of
operations had 13% higher annual sales growth than those registered from the
outset (20.4% compared with 18.1%), 39% higher annual productivity growth
(18.1% compared with 13.0%), but 42% lower annual employment growth rates
(3.6% compared with 6.2%). These descriptive statistics, however, do not control
for other determinants of firm performance.
Since the early 1990’s, there are a growing number of studies of the determi-
nants of firm performance in Turkey (Taymaz 2009; Aydin et al. 2007; Yasar and
Rejesus 2005). To explore the interrelationships among our dependent and inde-
pendent variables analytically using a regression set up between informal entre-
preneurship and firm performance, we estimated a Heckman regression model
which enables us to handle the potential endogeneity discussed in the methodol-
ogy (i.e., the endogenous choice of registration status by firms). Table 1 reveals
that for these formal enterprises with five or more employees, starting-up unreg-
istered is positively and significantly associated with higher subsequent sales and
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productivity growth rates, but is negatively and significantly associated with lower
employment growth rates. The average increase in sales growth is 3.01 percentage
points and thus 17% higher for those formal enterprises starting-up unregistered
compared with those registered from the outset (21.1% compared with 18.1%),
and productivity growth 2.36 percentage points and thus 18% higher (15.36%
compared with 13.0%), although employment growth is 1.48 percentage points
and thus 29% lower (4.72% compared with 6.2%). These regression results are
consistent with the descriptive bivariate relationships. Hence, hypothesis 1 is
Table 1: Impacts of non-registration at start-up on firm performance: Heckman selection model
Variable Log (sales growth)
Coefficient (s.e.)
Log (employment growth )
Coefficient (s.e.)
Log
(productivity growth)
Coefficient (s.e.)
Constant 115.97***(2.05) 105.52***(1.16) 112.34***(2.36)
Unregistered 3.01***(0.84) -1.48***(0.47) 4.88***(0.94)
Firm age -0.12***(0.02) -0.17***(0.01) 0.04(0.02)**
Exporter 02.43***(0.50) -1.27***(0.28) -1.10**(0.55)
Foreign ownership 2.52**(1.09) -1.40**(0.61) 3.99***(1.23)
Workforce
Top manager years of experience -0.07***(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.07***(0.02)
Temporary workers -0.06**(0.03) -0.01(0.02) -0.03(0.03)
Permanent fulltime workers 0.001(0.001) 0.01***(0.00) -0.01***(0.00)
Female ownership % -0.78*(0.46) -0.83***(0.26) 0.04(0.51)
Credit access -0.14(0.44) 1.38***(0.25) -1.34***(0.49)
Major constraints
Transport constraint -2.43***(0.77) -1.49***(0.43) -1.47*(0.86)
Electricity constraint 3.65***(0.55) 1.61***(0.30) 2.23***(0.61)
Innovation
Quality certification -0.78*(0.48) -1.19***(0.27) 0.32(0.54)
External auditor 1.47***(0.45) -1.39***(0.25) 3.08***(0.50)
Website 1.34**(0.60) 0.76**(0.33) 0.77(0.67)
E-mail 0.87(0.72) -0.36(0.40) 0.99(0.81)
Firm size (RC: small)
Medium 1.80***(0.54) 5.38**(0.30) -2.93***(0.61)
Large 0.38(0.72) 5.43***(0.40) -4.60***(0.82)
Legal status (RC: open shareholding)
Closed shareholding 4.31**(1.87) 1.83(1.10) 1.79(2.09)
Sole partnership 2.99(1.98) 4.30***(1.11) -2.15(2.22)
Partnership 0.36(2.45) 0.04(1.37) -0.98(2.73)
Limited partnership 5.62***(2.08) 0.75(1.16) 4.33*(2.32)
Other legal status 14.66***(4.26) -0.22(2.35) 15.87***(4.75)
Rho -0.34***(0.08) -0.04(0.15) -0.04(0.17)
Lambda -10.25***(2.46) -0.60(2.49) -1.41(5.56)
Wald Chi-square statistic (p-value) 235.39***(0.00) 951.08***(0.00) 228.61***(0.00)
No of observations 2494 2494 2494
*, **, *** statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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confirmed for two of the three performance indicators. This sits in contrast to a
previous finding in Turkey based on a smaller database and using a total factor
productivity (TFP) measure, which supports the view that unregistered firms are
less productive (Taymaz 2009). Our estimation set up takes the joint estimation of
the registration status (first-stage) and the performance indicator (second-stage)
equations and the rho parameter reported shows the strength of dependence
between the equations being stronger under the sales growth equation than the
employment and productivity growth equations. The lambda parameter shows the
Table 2: Impact of years spent unregistered on firm performance: Heckman selection model
Variable Log (sales growth)
Coefficient (s.e.)
Log (employment growth )
Coefficient (s.e.)
Log
(productivity growth)
Coefficient (s.e.)
Constant 116.00***(2.05) 105.51***(1.16) 112.4***(2.36)
Years unregistered 3.54***(0.96) -0.80(0.54) 4.81***(1.08)
Firm age -0.12***(0.01) -0.18***(0.01) 0.04**(0.02)
Exporter -2.47***(0.50) -1.22***(0.28) -1.19**(0.55)
Foreign ownership 2.54**(1.09) -1.41**(0.61) 4.02***(1.23)
Workforce
Top manager years of experience -0.07***(0.02) -0.00(0.01) -0.07***(0.02)
Temporary workers -0.06**(0.03) -0.001(0.002) -0.03(0.03)
Permanent workers 0.00(0.00) 0.01***(0.00) -0.004***(0.001)
Female ownership % -0.83*(0.46) -0.79***(0.26) -0.06(0.51)
Credit access -0.16(0.44) 1.39***(0.25) -1.37**(0.49)
Major constraints
Transport constraint -2.46***(0.77) -1.49***(0.43) -1.50*(0.86)
Electricity constraint 3.60***(0.55) 1.62***(0.30) 2.16***(0.61)
Innovation
Quality certification -0.77(0.48) -1.20***(0.27) 0.33(0.54)
External auditor 1.43***(0.45) -1.37***(0.25) 3.02***(0.50)
Website 1.37**(0.60) 0.74**(0.33) 0.83(0.66)
E-mail 0.83(0.72) -0.32(0.40) 0.91(0.80)
Firm size (RC: small)
Medium 1.84***(0.54) 5.38***(0.30) -2.89***(0.60)
Large 0.43(0.73) 5.43***(0.40) -4.55***(0.82)
Legal status (RC: open shareholding)
Closed shareholding 4.36**(1.86) 1.78*(1.05) 1.91(2.09)
Sole partnership 2.97(1.98) 4.24***(1.11) -2.11(2.22)
Partnership 0.33(2.45) 0.03(1.37) -0.99(2.74)
Limited partnership 5.59***(2.07) 0.70(1.17) 4.35*(2.32)
Other legal status 14.67***(4.26) -0.17(2.35) 15.85***(4.75)
Rho -0.34***(0.08) -0.02(0.18) -0.04(0.16)
Lambda -10.1***(2.52) -0.40(3.02) -1.36(5.54)
Wald Chi-square statistic (p-value) 235.8***(0.00) 942.7***(0.00) 221.2***(0.00)
No of observations 2494 2494 2494
*, **, *** statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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importance of correcting for sample selection bias and it is again significant for
the sales growth equation but not for the employment and productivity growth
equations.
Table 2, meanwhile, examines whether the length of time that these formal
enterprises spent unregistered influences their firm performance. Supporting hy-
pothesis 2, we find that controlling for other key determinants of firm performance
and the endogenous choice of registration status, enterprises spending longer
unregistered display significantly higher levels of both sales and productivity
growth, and that the log for employment growth is statistically insignificant, and
thus neither refutes our conjecture nor supports the opposite view that links years
spent unregistered negatively with firm performance. For each extra year of
nonregistration, sales growth is 3.54 percentage points higher, and productivity
growth 4.81 percentage points higher, both of which are significant, although
employment growth is 0.8 percentage points lower, although this is not significant.
Moreover, the observation that there are no differences between Tables 1 and 2
in terms of the sign and statistical significance of all the other additional explan-
atory variables displays that our results are robust. Whether we use the dummy/
binary variable indicating registration status as a regressor, or the number of years
spent unregistered before registration (which is a continuous variable), the key
findings do not change. As indicated by the rho, lambda parameters and also a
likelihood ratio (LR) test for the independence of equations, standard OLS are
used to check robustness further by estimating particularly those equations
pertaining to employment and productivity growth where the selectivity bias
problem is less severe and the dependence between the selection and the primary
equation is limited.1 All the specified models reported in Tables 1 and 2 have
strong explanatory power of the variation of all the three firm performance
indicators as shown by the diagnostics. This is evident from the large Wald chi-
square statistic and its associated p-value which is statistically significant.
Discussion and conclusions
This analysis of WBES data reveals that in Turkey, 1 in 25 of the formal private
sector businesses with five employees or more surveyed had started-up unregis-
tered and of these, the average length of time that they spent unregistered was six
months. For these formal enterprises, starting-up unregistered is positively and
significantly associated with higher subsequent sales and productivity growth
rates, but is negatively and significantly associated with lower employment growth
rates. Moreover, the longer they spend unregistered, the significantly higher is
their sales and productivity growth rates, and the log for employment growth is
statistically insignificant, thus neither refuting our conjecture nor supporting the
opposite view that links years spent unregistered negatively with firm perfor-
mance. No significant associations are thus identified between length of non-
registration and lower firm performance. Overall, therefore, evidence is found to
support hypothesis 1 in both sales and productivity growth rates, but not
1 These results can be provided upon request.
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employment growth rates, whilst evidence is found to confirm hypothesis 2 that
length of nonregistration improves firm performance in terms of sales and pro-
ductivity growth rates, and no evidence to refute it.
Our findings have important implications. They contribute to the advancement
of the shift away from negative representations of informal entrepreneurship by
displaying that formal enterprises in Turkey that began unregistered and only later
registered, and those spending longer unregistered before registering, do not
display weaker subsequent firm performance than those registered from the outset.
This confirms the two hypotheses posed in this study. Instead, being unregistered
at start-up significantly boosts subsequent sales and productivity growth, as does a
lengthier period of being unregistered. This finding that those unregistered at start-
up display better subsequent sales and productivity growth figures, but lower
employment growth rates, suggests that those delaying business registration, used
this period to establish the conditions to become more capital-intensive and less
labour-intensive once they registered. These results also display that for these
formal enterprises, the benefits of being nonregistered at start-up outweigh the
benefits of registering at the outset, reflected in the higher subsequent firm
performance of the enterprises starting-up, and spending longer, unregistered. This
intimates that the deficiencies of the formal institutional environment have a key
role to play in determining the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship.
This has important policy implications. For many years, based on a negative
depiction of informal entrepreneurship as poorer performing, the conventional
policy approach was to seek its eradication. Drawing on the Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) rational economic actor approach that seeks to change the costs
of operating informally and benefits of operating formally, governments predom-
inantly increased the costs of informality by increasing the penalties. This paper
suggests that there is also a need to reduce the costs and improve the benefits of
registration since the benefits currently appear insufficient to outweigh the benefits
of nonregistration at start-up in Turkey, reflected in the weaker subsequent firm
performance. This requires a simplification of registration, and a reduction in the
costs and improvement in the benefits of registration (Maloney 2004; McKenzie
and Woodruff 2006). Indeed, in terms of the ease of starting a business, Turkey in
2012 at the time of this survey was ranked 61st out of 183 countries, since this
requires six procedures, takes six days, costs 11.2% of income per capita and
requires a minimum of 8.7% of income per capita (Eurofound 2013).
This means that there is (though indirectly) a need to deal with the systemic
formal institutional deficiencies that lead entrepreneurs to decide to start-up their
ventures on an unregistered basis. In recent years, recognition has emerged,
grounded in institutional theory, that informal entrepreneurs are also often social
actors (De Castro et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2009, 2013, 2014; Williams and Shahid
2015). Based on this view that informal entrepreneurship arises when entrepre-
neurs’ norms, values and beliefs are not in symmetry with the prescriptions of
formal institutions, there is thus a need to tackle the formal institutional imper-
fections that provide little incentive for entrepreneurs to register and adhere to the
laws and regulations of the formal institutional environment. These alterations
required in formal institutions are of two types. On the one hand, tax fairness,
procedural justice and redistributive justice needs to be improved. Fairness here
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refers to the extent to which entrepreneurs believe they are paying their fair share
compared with others (Wenzel 2004), redistributive justice to whether they
receive the goods and services they feel that they deserve given the taxes that
they pay (Richardson and Sawyer 2001) and procedural justice to the degree to
which they believe that the tax authority has treated then in a respectful, impartial
and responsible manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart 2000; Murphy 2005). On the
other hand, it requires greater social protection, less public sector corruption and
more effective social transfer mechanisms, all of which have been shown to be
strongly correlated with a reduced prevalence of informal entrepreneurship (Autio
and Fu 2015; Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Klapper et al. 2007; Thai and
Turkina 2014).
Nevertheless, there are limitations to this study. Only one country is here
analysed and this paper reveals only that formal enterprises with five more
employees who started-up unregistered witness higher subsequent sales and pro-
ductivity growth than those that registered from the outset. We can therefore only
assert that those formal enterprises that started unregistered outperform those
registered from the outset; we cannot argue that unregistered enterprises as a
whole outperform registered enterprises as a whole. Nevertheless, some very
tentative clues exist that this may be worth investigating in future research.
Similar to formal enterprises that delay registration, they operate under the same
conditions that boost firm performance, including being able to avoid taxes,
burdensome regulations and corrupt public sector officials. Consequently, future
research could investigate the firm performance of unregistered compared with
registered enterprises, especially given the current weak evidence to support the
poorer performance thesis of unregistered enterprises (e.g., La Porta and Shleifer
2008). A further limitation of this study is that it cannot evaluate whether the
reasons for entrepreneurs operating unregistered (e.g., whether they are simply
awaiting registration, deliberately testing the venture’s viability before registering,
or have no intent to register) or the reasons enterprises register (e.g., better access
to finance or markets, fewer bribes, better opportunities with formal firms, more
access to government programs), influence subsequent firm performance. Future
research needs to do this, not least in order to tailor policy measures. And finally,
these findings suggest that a more rigorous evaluation of other assumptions
regarding the negative and potentially positive impacts of informal entrepreneur-
ship is now required, such as whether customers benefit from more affordable
goods and services.
In sum, this paper has revealed that formal enterprises which delayed registra-
tion outperform those which started-up registered in Turkey, calling into question
the long-standing depiction of informal entrepreneurship as poorer performing. If
this now stimulates similar research in other countries and global regions, and a
critical evaluation of other supposedly negative and positive impacts of informal
entrepreneurship, then one intention will have been fulfilled. If this then leads to
questions being raised about what policy approaches should be pursued towards
informal entrepreneurship, this paper will have achieved its fuller intention. What
is certain, however, is that the until now dominant negative representation of
informal entrepreneurship as poorly performing can no longer simply be assumed
without providing any evidence-base to support such an assertion.
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Appendix: Distribution of Performance Indicators
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